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INTRODUCTION
Organ donation by incompetent patients is a controversial
issue that demands special attention from the law in order to
protect the rights of incompetent patients. The standards used to
make other medical decisions for incompetent patients may be
inappropriate in this context, given the lack of any concrete
physical benefit to the patient.' The selfless nature of organ do-
nation requires that we look more carefully at the current state
of the law and alter it as needed for this unique situation. The
issue is particularly pressing given the short supply of, and high
demand for, organs, which has caused many people to look to
incompetent family members as a source of non-vital organs.2
This Comment addresses the standards currently used by courts,
as well as the alternatives that have been proposed, and ulti-
mately recommends a new hybrid approach tailored to the spe-
cific circumstances of the individual incompetent patient.
When a patient lacks the ability to make his or her own
medical decisions, a court declares that patient legally incompe-
tent and appoints a guardian.3 It follows that when medical deci-
sions must be made, a surrogate decisionmaker is required. The
patient's guardian is typically involved in this process. If the pa-
tient is a minor, the guardian is usually a parent, although the
t B.S. 2004, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. Candidate 2007, University of
Chicago.
1 See, for example, Ray Foemming and Betsy Abramson, Wisconsin Department of
Health and Family Services Division of Supportive Living. Guardianship of Adults: A
decision-making guide for family members, friends and advocates 20-21 (1997) ("Where
the procedure involves risk, is irreversible, and does not clearly benefit the individual, a
guardian in Wisconsin probably lacks authority to consent for the person.").
2 For a general discussion, see John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents
and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 Colum L Rev 48 (1976) (discussing the in-
creasing use of intra-familial organ transplants).
3 See Cruzan v Director, 497 US 261, 280 (1990) ("An incompetent person is not able
to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse
treatment or any other right. Such a 'right' must be exercised for her, if at all, by some
sort of surrogate.").
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court may appoint another guardian; if the patient is an adult,
the court will appoint a parent, family member, or other adult as
the guardian.4 Some courts have held that a judge must make
the determination as to the correct medical decision,5 while oth-
ers allow a doctor to make the decision.6 When a surrogate
makes a medical decision for the patient, the surrogate must act
in accordance with a legal standard. Two standards, the "substi-
tuted judgment" standard and the "best interests of the patient"
standard, are widely used.'
The substituted judgment standard, which is more fre-
quently used, attempts to determine what the patient would do if
competent to make the decision.' Generally, the decisionmaker
looks first to any formal advance health care directives or previ-
ous statements about medical decisions, and then addresses the
patient's values, any religious beliefs, the effect on the family,
and other concerns.9 Although this is the dominant standard,
several commentators have criticized it. One common criticism is
that it is a legal fiction that allows the biases and personal opin-
ions of the decisionmaker to influence the decision.1°
As an alternative, courts have used a best interests of the
patient standard. This standard looks objectively at the situation
4 See, for example, Anna Schork Fraleigh, Notes: An Alternative to Guardianship.-
Should Michigan Statutorily Allow Acute-Care Hospitals to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions for Incompetent Patients Who Have Neither Identifiable Surrogates nor Ad-
vance Directives., 76 U Det Mercy L Rev 1079, 1095-1108 (1999) (describing Michigan's
procedures for guardianship appointments).
5 See, for example, Rogers v Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health,
458 NE2d 308, 310 (Mass 1983) ("If a patient is adjudicated incompetent, a judge, using a
substituted-judgment standard, shall decide whether the patient would have consented
[to the treatment].") (citations omitted); Superintendent ofBelchertown v Saikewicz, 370
NE2d 417, 433 ("The Probate Court is... the proper tribunal to determine the best inter-
ests of a ward.").
6 See Washington v Harper, 494 US 210 (1990) (holding that the due process clause
does not require a judge to make a determination regarding involuntary medication of a
prisoner, but, instead, allows prison doctors to make the determination).
7 See Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests:
Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients
Without Advance Instructions, 48 Rutgers L Rev 1193, 1197 (1996) (describing substi-
tuted judgment and best interests as "the decisionmaking standards ... usually applied
to incompetent medical patients who have left no prior instructions").
8 See In re A.C., 573 A2d 1235, 1249 (DC App 1990) ("[T]he court ... [must] deter-
mine as best it can what choice that individual, if competent, would make with respect to
medical procedures.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
9 Id at 1249-50.
10 See, for example, Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors: Re-
thinking Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 13 Health Matrix 235,
250 (2003) ("No matter how one dresses it up, A deciding for B is not an exercise of B's
autonomy."); Cantor, 48 Rutgers L Rev 1193 (cited in note 7) (arguing that substituted
judgment allows surrogates to make quality decisions for the patient).
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and tries to determine what is in the patient's best interests."
Both medical and psychological factors can be considered. 2 The
best interests standard recognizes that it may be impossible to
determine what an incompetent patient would really choose to
do. This is especially true when the patient has been incompe-
tent his or her entire life. However, the standard is also subject
to criticism; for example, it has been criticized for not adequately
respecting the patient's autonomy.
This Comment undertakes a cost-benefit analysis of each of
the standards, and proposed alternatives, in the context of organ
donation. Part I introduces organ donation and legal incompe-
tence. Part II discusses the substituted judgment and best inter-
ests standards. It reviews the law in this area and addresses the
costs and benefits of each approach, specifically in the context of
organ donations. Also, it deals with the costs and benefits of each
approach when the patient was previously competent and, alter-
natively, when the patient has never been competent. Part III
discusses alternative standards, focusing on the same concerns
addressed in Part II. Part IV will speak to the question of who is
the best decisionmaker.
Part V proposes a framework for answering this question.
Applying this framework suggests that the substituted judgment
standard should be used when the patient was previously compe-
tent because it respects the patient's autonomy and helps friends
and family to feel that the right decision has been made. How-
ever, when the patient has never been competent to make medi-
cal decisions, the best interests standard should be used. It is
impossible to determine what the patient would have chosen to
do when that patient has never been competent to consider and
make such a decision. Finally, the decisionmaker should be a
hospital ethics committee or review board, comprised of doctors,
lawyers, ethicists, and others, to ensure that all viewpoints are
considered and that the decision is unbiased.
11 See In re Conroy, 486 A2d 1209, 1231 (NJ 1985) (allowing guardians to make
medical decisions for incompetent patients "if it is manifest that such action would fur-
ther the patient's best interests in a narrow sense of the phrase, even though the subjec-
tive test that we articulated above may not be satisfied").
12 See, for example, Little v Little, 576 SW2d 493, 499-500 (Tex App 1979) (consider-
ing the medical risks and the psychological benefits to the donor).
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I. ORGAN DONATION AND INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
Living organ donors typically donate a kidney, part of the
liver, or bone marrow. 3 Under normal circumstances, donation
does not involve serious physical risk or pain to the donor.14
However, the physical risks to the donor should not be mini-
mized, especially in the case of kidney or liver donations, which
are major surgeries involving general anesthesia and all the as-
sociated risks." Also, in the case of kidney donation, the donor is
left with only one kidney, which puts him at a greater risk for
kidney complications in the future. Furthermore, at least one
commentator argues that donation may involve substantial psy-
chological harms to donors, 6 although others minimize this con-
cern.'7 Siblings are usually the best donors, for reasons including
matching blood types and relative ages of the donor and recipi-
ent.'8 Sometimes, therefore, the best possible match, and maybe
13 Kidneys can be safely donated as long as the donor has another healthy kidney,
part of the liver can be donated due to the liver's ability to regenerate itself, and bone
marrow can also be donated because of its ability to be regenerated. See Michael T. Mor-
ley, Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 Yale L J 1215, 1220-22
(2002) (describing the possibility of, and the techniques used for, kidney, partial liver,
and bone marrow transplants).
14 Id at 1221.
'" See R.W. Strong and S.V. Lynch, Ethical Issues in Living Related Donor Liver
Transplantation, in Arthur L. Caplan and Daniel H. Coelho, eds, The Ethics of Organ
Transplants: The Current Debate 44 (Prometheus Books 1998) ("The risk to the donor is
that associated with a major operation in the form of perioperative complications and
long-term sequelae."); Aaron Spital, Ethical Issues in Living Related Donors, in Wayne
Shelton and John Balint, eds, 7 The Ethics of Organ Transplantation 103 (Oxford 2001)
("Donor nephrectomy is a major surgical procedure and postoperative complications are
inevitable ... average postoperative complication rate of 32% ... most of these were
minor.").
16 See Cara Cheyette, Note, Organ Harvests form the Legally Incompetent: An Ar-
gument Against Compelled Altruism, 41 BC L Rev 465, 474-80 (2000) (reviewing studies
that suggest both kidney donors and bone marrow donors may suffer significant psycho-
logical harm). See also Spital, Ethical Issues in Living Related Donors at 104 (cited in
note 15) ("Psychological complications, especially depression, have also been reported.");
Philip Cohen, Donor's Dread: Why do children who help a sick sibling end up depressed?,
155 New Scientist 1, 20 (23 August 1997) ("Children who donate ... suffer from depres-
sion, nightmares and low self-esteem, even years later.").
17 See Morley, 111 Yale IJ at 1223 (cited in note 13) ("[C]laims that organ donation is
psychologically harmful to donors are unsupported, and even contradicted, by research
results."). See also Deane L. Wolcott, et al, Psychological Adjustment ofAdult Bone Mar-
row Transplant Donors Whose Recipient Survives, 41 Transplantation 413, 484 (1986)
("[Bone marrow] donors manifested little emotional distress, high self-esteem, and a high
degree of current life satisfaction."); S. Younger, Organ Donation and Procurement, in
John Craven and Gary M. Rodin, eds, Psychiatric Aspects of Organ Transplantation 126
(Oxford 1992) ("[Mlost studies suggest that organ donors have found the experience to be
a positive one.").
18 See Morley, 111 Yale IJ at 1216 (cited in note 13) (explaining the need for a donor
of similar age and stature, saying, "members of a patient's immediate family, especially
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the only possible match, will be the recipient's incompetent sib-
ling.
Incompetency is defined as a "[1lack of legal ability in some
respect." 9 Looking to a variety of factors, a court determines
whether a person is legally incompetent.2" Generally, children
are also considered legally incompetent-their parents must
make medical decisions for them.21 Therefore, it is logically in-
ferred that if a child is born healthy but becomes severely cogni-
tively impaired before becoming an adult, that child has never
been competent for purposes of surrogate decisionmaking. How-
ever, when patients were close to eighteen before becoming se-
verely cognitively impaired, it is debatable whether their ex-
pressed preferences and values should be considered.22 Finally, it
is also clear that patients who were born severely cognitively
impaired have never been competent.
Incompetence can vary among patients from severe and pro-
foundly impairing, to mild and less impairing. When incompe-
tence is severe, the patient will have limited awareness of his or
her surroundings and will often have serious medical conditions.
For example, Claire Conroy, an incompetent patient, was "con-
fined to bed ... she could not speak," and she had numerous
medical conditions.23 When incompetence is at its most severe,
the patient may be in a persistent vegetative state, as was Nancy
Cruzan.24 This is a "condition in which a person exhibits motor
reflexes but evinces no indication of significant cognitive func-
siblings, are among the best potential organ donors") (citations omitted). See also Spital,
Ethical Issues in Living Related Donors at 104 (cited in note 15) ("[L]iving relatives [are]
the preferred source of transplanted kidneys.").
19 Black's Law Dictionary 526 (8th ed 2004). Incompetence is generally defined in
terms of incompetence to do a particular thing. For example, we would generally say that
a person is "incompetent to make financial decisions" or "incompetent to make medical
decisions." This comment deals with patients who are incompetent to make medical deci-
sions.
20 See, for example, Fraleigh, 76 U Det Mercy L Rev at 1082-83 (cited in note 4) (de-
scribing Michigan's procedures for determining incompetence).
21 Robert W. Griner, Live Organ Donations Between Siblings and the Best Interest
Standard: Time for Stricter Judicial Intervention, 10 Ga St U L Rev 589, 589 (1994) (not-
ing that parents "have generally been allowed to determine what medical treatment their
children are to receive").
22 See, for example, Hurdle v Currier, 5 Va Cir 509, 512-13 (Va Cir 1977) (giving
parents authority to consent to kidney donation by their minor daughter for her sister,
where the mentally competent minor was sixteen years old and the court felt she dis-
played the maturity to understand the decision to donate). That question is beyond the
scope of this Comment, though it is an issue that should be addressed.
23 In re Conroy, 486 A2d at 1217.
24 Cruzan vDirector, 497 US 261, 266 (1990).
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tion."25 On the other hand, some incompetent patients can talk
and have relationships, but do not have the mental ability to
make medical decisions due to some mental impairment, such as
Downs Syndrome. This was the condition of Jerry Strunk, who
was incompetent due to, as the court put it, his "feeble-
minded[ness]" and "IQ of approximately 35."26 The court permit-
ted Jerry to donate an organ.27 The severity of incompetence can
therefore vary significantly and should be considered.
II. THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT AND BEST INTERESTS
STANDARDS
The right to control one's own medical decisions is a consti-
tutional right.2" This section lays out this right and traces its de-
velopment in the context of incompetent patients. Courts differ
in their approach to this right and particularly in their approach
to applying this right to organ donation by incompetent patients.
But they have generally relied on two standards. This section
details these two standards-the substituted judgment standard
and the best interests standard-and addresses the costs and
benefits of each approach.
A. Legal Right at Stake in Organ Donation
The right of patients to refuse or accept medical treatment is
protected by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.29
That clause gives individuals a liberty right to make their own
medical decisions.3 ° Justice Cardozo, in a case involving informed
consent, explained that "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
25 Id.
26 Strunk v Strunk, 445 SW2d 145, 146 (Ky 1969).
27 Id at 145.
28 See Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 202 (1991) (acknowledging a "Fifth Amendment
right to medical self-determination").
29 See Cruzan v Director, 497 US 261, 278 (1990) ("The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.' The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions."); Mills v Rogers, 457 US 291, 299 (1982) (stating that "the Constitution recog-
nizes a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"); In
re A. C., 573 A2d at 1247 (stating that "every person has a right, under the common law
and the Constitution, to accept or refuse medical treatment"). See also, Norman L. Can-
tor, The Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled
Persons, 13 Ann Health L 37, 37 (2004) ("People have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
right to make important medical choices.").
30 Id.
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own body."31 Courts and commentators have used this quotation
to describe a patient's right to autonomy in medical decision-
making.32 That right was extended to incompetent patients by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in In re Quinlan,33 which
firmly established that an incompetent patient's "right of privacy
may be asserted on her behalf by her guardian. '3 4 The Supreme
Court, in Cruzan v Director," while acknowledging a federal
right of privacy, explained that, "under certain circumstances a
surrogate may act for the patient."36 Other courts have reiterated
the view that there is an individual right "under the common law
and the Constitution ... of bodily integrity," regardless of the
degree of competence.37
However, these constitutional issues cannot and should not
be considered independently of state law.38 Because state law can
provide more substantive protection, the federal Constitution
defines only a minimum sphere of protection. Therefore, there is
no national consensus on what standard is best, or what the
standards mean. Federal and state courts have used both stan-
dards and given each standard slightly different interpretations.
B. Two Prevailing Standards
Courts have based their decisions to grant requests for organ
donation from incompetent patients on both the substituted
judgment and best interests standards. One of the first instances
of an appellate court upholding a lower court's approval of organ
donation by an incompetent patient was based on the substituted
judgment standard. In Strunk v Strunk,9 the parents of an in-
competent adult child, Jerry, sought court permission to have
one of his kidneys removed and donated to his competent
31 Schloendorff vSocietyofNew York Hospital, 211 NY 125, 129 (NY 1914).
32 See, for example, Cruzan, 497 US at 270 ("The logical corollary of the doctrine of
informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is,
to refuse treatment.").
33 355 A2d 647 (NJ 1976).
34 Id at 664.
3' 497 US 261 (1990).
36 Id at 280. The Court did, however, approve of a clear and convincing evidence
standard to determine what the patient would have done. Id at 265.
" In reA.C., 573 A2d 1235, 1247 (DC App 1991).
38 See Mills, 457 US at 303 (stating that "[i]f the state interest is broader, the sub-
stantive protection that the Constitution affords ... would not determine the actual sub-
stantive rights and duties of persons in the [s]tate"). Furthermore, "state-created liberty
rights are entitled to the protection of the federal Due Process Clause." Id at 300.
'9 445 SW2d 145 (Ky 1969).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
brother, Tommy.4 ° The court used the substituted judgment
standard to determine that Jerry would have authorized the do-
nation, explaining that donating the kidney would be "beneficial
to Jerry because Jerry was greatly dependent upon [his brother],
emotionally and psychologically, and ... his well-being would be
jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the
removal of a kidney."4 However, the fact that all members of the
family agreed to the transplant made that case easier for the
court to decide.
Courts have also based their decisions to allow for organ do-
nation on an evaluation of the benefits the patients receive from
the donation. For instance, in Little v Little,43 a case very similar
to Strunk, a mother sought permission to have her incompetent
daughter donate a kidney to her competent son.44 The court did
not expressly use a "best interests" standard, but the language is
similar to that approach. The opinion discussed the benefits that
the patient would receive from having her brother live, stating
that there was a "close relationship"4 between the siblings, and
that the basis for allowing the transplant was "evidence to the
effect that she will receive substantial psychological benefits."46
The court also weighed the benefits to the rest of the family and
the minimal risks to the patient.47 Furthermore, the court be-
lieved that,
[a]lthough in Strunk the Kentucky Court discussed the
substituted judgment doctrine in some detail, the conclu-
sion of the majority there was based on the benefits that
the incompetent donor would derive, rather than on the
theory that the incompetent would have consented to the
transplant if he were competent.4"
In other words, the Little court believed that the Strunk
court had used a best interests standard. This seems to be a
plausible interpretation of the opinion in Strunk, which focused
40 Id at 145-46.
41 Id at 146. The court also stressed that Jerry "identifie[d] with his brother Tom;
Tom [was] his model." Id (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, Jerry was the
only compatible donor for his brother. Id.
42 Id at 147.
43 576 SW2d 493 (Tex App 1979).
44 Little, 576 SW2d at 494.
45 Id at 498.
46 Id at 500.
41 Id at 499-500.
41 Little, 576 SW2d at 498.
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almost exclusively on the benefit that Jerry would receive if his
brother lived. Another court case allowing organ donation by an
incompetent patient to his brother, In re Doe,49 explicitly used
the best interests standard. There, the court found that "the
benefits to the incompetent if his brother lives outweigh the
physiological and psychological risks.""
Some courts, on the other hand, have denied organ trans-
plants from incompetent patients. For example, in Lausier v Pe-
scinski,51 the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to adopt the sub-
stituted judgment standard and would not authorize an organ
transplant. The court noted that it had no statutory authority to
do so. 2 Furthermore, the court stated that
An incompetent particularly should have his own inter-
ests protected. Certainly no advantage should be taken of
him. In the absence of real consent on his part, and in a
situation where no benefit to him has been established,
we fail to find any authority for the county court, or this
court, to approve this operation.53
That court apparently did not believe that adequate benefit
to the incompetent patient was shown by the fact that the recipi-
ent was a sibling. A Louisiana appellate court also refused to
authorize a transplant in In re Richardson.54 The court argued
that because Louisiana law prohibited guardians from making
gifts from a minor's estate, it was inconceivable that the law
would permit the guardian to authorize what is often referred to
as the ultimate gift-an organ."5 These are not the only cases of
courts refusing to authorize organ transplants from incompetent
patients.56 However, in most circumstances courts have permit-
49 104 AD2d 200 (NY App Div 1984).
50 Id at 201.
51 226 NW2d 180 (Wis 1975).
52 Id at 181-82.
53 Id at 182.
54 284 So2d 185 (La App 1973).
5 Id at 187.
56 Most cases deciding whether organ donation is permissible are decided by the
lower courts and not appealed; therefore, these cases are unreported. The lack of further
reported cases on the subject does not necessarily mean that there are only two cases
where donation has not been permitted. See Robertson, 76 Colum L Rev at 53 n 26 (cited
in note 2) (acknowledging the possibility of unreported cases which may deny organ
transplants from incompetent individuals). For a case prohibiting donation by a minor
child, see Curran v Bosze, 566 NE2d 1319 (Ill 1990) (refusing to order a bone marrow
transplant from a minor child where that child did not have a relationship with the re-
cipient, a half-brother, and therefore would receive no benefit from donating).
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ted these transplants to go forward, generally under some form
of the best interests standard, although not always explicitly so."
C. Substituted Judgment Standard
Many state and federal courts use the substituted judgment
standard, although each may have a slightly different interpre-
tation. Most courts agree that "the substituted judgment inquiry
is primarily a subjective one: as nearly as possible, the court
must ascertain what the patient would do if competent.""8 The
general framework suggests that, "the greatest weight should be
given to previously expressed wishes of the patient."59 This would
include any advance health care directives written by the patient
while competent or any serious discussions about the issue with
family or friends that the patient had while competent.6 ° Also,
while general statements about the treatment deserve some
weight, absolute objections to the procedure6' and clear state-
ments about a desire to undergo a specific procedure should be
honored. In the organ donation context, a person might have
said, "I will never donate an organ," or "if a family member ever
needs a kidney, I will donate one of mine."62 These kinds of
statements provide strong evidence about what the patient
would do if competent and should be respected. Less clear state-
ments should be given some weight.6 But statements about
medical care generally, rather than organ donation in particular,
57 See Robertson, 76 Colum L Rev at 53 (cited in note 2) ("Judicial approval for intra-
family transplants from incompetent donors has been obtained in most cases."); Little,
576 SW2d at 497 (acknowledging that intrafamily organ donation by incompetent pa-
tients has been approved in most cases). See also, cases allowing organ donation by minor
children: Hart v Brown, 29 Conn Supp 386, 391 (1972) (upholding parents' authority to
order organ donation by their minor child for the child's twin sibling); Hurdle, 5 Va Cir
509 (giving parents authority to consent to kidney donation by their minor daughter for
her sister, where the minor was sixteen years old and would benefit from a continued
relationship with her sister).
58 In re A. C., 573 A2d 1235, 1249 (DC App 1990) (citations omitted).
59 Id at 1250.
60 See id (previously expressed wishes "includes prior statements, written or oral").
61 See In re Boyd, 403 A2d 744, 751 (DC App 1979) (stating that clear objections to
treatment should be respected).
62 See Hurdle, 5 Va Cir 509 (holding that because the donor initiated conversations
with her sister about donating a kidney and seemed to be mature enough to make that
decision, the donation should be permitted). Although that case involved a minor child
rather than an incompetent patient, it shows that courts will consider clear statements
made about the donor's preferences. The donor in that case was sixteen and the court
believed that she was mature enough to decide whether to donate.
63 See In re Conroy, 486 A2d at 1230 (holding that the "consistency" and "thoughtful-
ness" of prior statements weigh on the probative value of the statements).
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should be given less weight.64 Also, statements made off the cuff
and without actual consideration of the issue should be taken
with a grain of salt.65 Although family or friends could fabricate
any of these kinds of statements, we often rely on the ability of
the decisionmaker to judge the credibility of testimony based on
the demeanor and believability of the witness, and we should do
so here.66
Courts consider other factors as well. Some courts look to
previous medical decisions made by the patient.6 ' Additionally,
courts have referenced the patient's "value system,"6 8 and the
patient's "religious beliefs, if any."69 Some courts also stress the
importance of examining "the impact of the decision on the [pa-
tient's] family ... the probability of adverse side effects ... the
prognosis without treatment ... the prognosis with treatment
... [and] any other factors which appear relevant." ° Finally, one
court has said that "the court may supplement its knowledge
about the patient by determining what most persons would likely
do in a similar situation."7'
Courts generally speak about protecting the autonomy of the
patient when using this standard. Although that is the main
benefit of this approach, the standard may also benefit the
friends and family of the patient. However, there are also costs to
this approach that must be considered.
64 See id ("Another factor that would affect the probative value of a person's prior
statements of intent would be their specificity.").
65 See In re A.C., 573 A2d at 1251 ("The court should consider the context in which
prior declarations, treatment decisions, ad expressions of personal values were made,
including whether statements were made casually or after contemplation."); In re Conroy,
486 A2d at 1230 (explaining that "an offhand remark" does not "constitute clear proof"
that the patient would actually want that result).
66 See In re A. C., 573 A2d at 1250 ("The court should be mindful, however, that while
in the majority of cases family members will have the best interests of the patient in
mind, sometimes family members will rely on their own judgments or predilections
rather than serving as conduits for expressing the patient's wishes.").
67 See id ("The court should also consider previous decisions of the patient concerning
medical treatment."). See also In re Boyd, 403 A2d at 751 (holding that when previous
actions indicate the patient has a strong adherence to, and has not vacillated from, a
particular viewpoint about treatment, that view should be respected).
61 In reA.C., 573 A2d at 1250.
69 In re Moe, 432 NE2d 712, 732 (Mass 1982).
70 Rogers, 458 NE2d at 318-19.
71 In reA.C., 573 A2d at 1251 (citations omitted). The court was clear to say that this
should be considered only "[a]fter considering the patient's prior statements, if any, the
previous medical decisions of the patient, and the values held by the patient." Id.
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1. Benefits.
a) Respect for patient autonomy. One of the main concerns
in this area of the law is respecting the patient's autonomy.7'
Even if the patient will never be aware of the treatment decision,
such as if he is in a persistent vegetative state, he is still a hu-
man with equal rights. Just as we would not force a competent
adult to give up a kidney, we should not force an incompetent
person to do so.'7 On the other hand, a blanket rule that incom-
petent patients could never donate organs would not respect
their autonomy either. ' The patient may have had a strong de-
sire to donate organs, or may have loved his sibling and done
anything to help her. Denying incompetent patients the right to
donate their organs, therefore, would treat them as unequals. 75
The substituted judgment standard attempts to resolve this
dilemma-and respect the patient's autonomy-by trying to dis-
cern what the patient really would have wanted. Where the pa-
tient, while previously competent, expressed a preference for
treatment in such a case, the substituted judgment standard re-
flects and honors this preference. Although a choice made in the
past may not be the same choice the patient would make if cur-
rently competent, "a person anticipating future medical situa-
tions may still have well-developed values" about the desired
treatment if he should become incompetent. v6 Even where no
such preference was articulated, looking to the patient's values
and other medical decisions may lead to the right decision while
72 See Cantor, 48 Rutgers L Rev at 1204 (cited in note 7) ("Substituted judgment
focuses on replicating a patient's likely choice and thus serves as a natural vehicle for
promoting the self-determination interests cherished in American culture and jurispru-
dence."). For a general discussion, see Dworkin, 13 Health Matrix 235 (cited in note 10)
(discussing the necessity of respecting patient autonomy over medical paternalism).
73 See Cheyette, 41 BC L Rev at 467-69 (cited in note 16) (arguing that organ dona-
tion by incompetent patients should be prohibited and noting that "competent adults are
under no compulsion to submit to organ harvests for the benefit of third parties").
74 See Robertson, 76 Colum L Rev at 74 (cited in note 2) ("We may conclude that
respect for persons requires that we always presume that [the patient] says no to any
intrusive procedure. But if, in fact, [the patient] would have chosen the procedure, he has
been treated unequally in a real sense, because, unlike competents, he has been pre-
vented from realizing his choices.").
75 See Morley, 111 Yale IJ at 1218 (cited in note 13) ("[T]he constitutional rights of
children and mentally impaired persons ... are violated when the law fails to provide a
mechanism through which proxy consent may be tendered for donation of a nonvital
organ to an immediate family member."); Robertson, 76 Colum L Rev at 62 (cited in note
2) (noting that "transplants from those legally incapable of consent are consistent with
and even required by respect for persons if it is clear that the incompetent, if competent,
would have consented to the transplant").
76 Cantor, 13 Ann Health L at 39-40 (cited in note 29).
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respecting the patient's autonomy. If it does not lead to the right
decision, using this standard makes it more likely that the pa-
tient would "agree that he had been fairly treated"; at least if the
substituted judgment was based on sound reasoning and an at-
tempt to gauge his preferences."v As noted above, expressed pref-
erences may be oral or written statements about preferences and
may include conversations with loved ones about the treatment
decision.78
On the other hand, when a court using a substituted judg-
ment standard "supplement[s] its knowledge about the patient
by determining what most persons would likely do in a similar
situation,"79 that court is not respecting the patient's autonomy.
The substituted judgment standard respects autonomy because
it is individualized. However, "determining what most persons
would likely do in a similar situation, " ' appears to be a reason-
able-person standard. Even where the probability that most peo-
ple would make a particular choice is very high, the idiosyncratic
patient should not be forced into everyone else's mold. It is not
the case that the more idiosyncratic a patient's preferences the
less respect we owe to his autonomy. If the court does not have
enough information about the patient's subjective preferences,
the substituted judgment standard is inappropriate.
) Closure for relatives and friends. Very often family mem-
bers or close friends serve as the patient's legal guardian. They
will likely know the patient well and have a good grasp on the
patient's preferences and desired medical treatment. The substi-
tuted judgment standard allows them to express these prefer-
ences for the patient. Because it considers previously expressed
preferences, substituted judgment would likely be the standard
that guardians would prefer.
The benefit of the substituted judgment standard to family
and friends can be understood by examining what would happen
if the best interests standard were used instead. If the patient
had idiosyncratic preferences that are against his best interests
and the best interests standard is used nonetheless, the guardi-
ans may feel that the decisionmaker made the wrong choice. This
may leave guardians and other surrogate decisionmakers with
less respect for the legal system and a feeling that their family
V Robertson, 76 Colum L Rev at 63 (cited in note 2).
71 In reA.C., 573 A2d at 1250.
711 Id at 1251.
8o Id.
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member or friend has been cheated by the law.8 ' For example,
imagine that an adult, while competent, expressed to his parents
his desire to donate a kidney to his sick sister. If that adult later
becomes incompetent and the best interests standard prevents
the incompetent adult from donating, the parents may feel that
the law utterly failed to honor their child's wishes and violated
his autonomy to make that choice. This example is equally
strong in the situation of an elder adult parent who expressed
his desire to sacrifice anything for the well-being of his children.
If this elder adult loses his decision-making capacity and, thus, is
legally incompetent, the best interests standard may not allow
him to be a donor for his child. This is an important considera-
tion because when people feel that the law is not adequately ad-
dressing their circumstances, they may resort to extra-legal
means to reach their ends. 2 In the organ donation context, peo-
ple could use a black market for organs or find an unethical doc-
tor to do the transplant without legal approval." If this became
common practice, it would seriously weaken the legal system's
ability to prevent the harvesting of incompetent patients for or-
gans. Therefore, it is important that people who must deal with
the law feel that it treats them, and their loved ones, fairly. The
substituted judgment standard achieves that goal.
However, if the legal system's main concern is respecting the
patient's autonomy, how the family and friends feel about the
decision may be wholly irrelevant to the choice of a standard.
How the family and friends feel about the decision would be a
benefit mainly from a practical point of view (addressing the con-
cerns raised about respect for the legal system), rather than a
benefit out of concern for the patient. Additionally, if the guard-
ian is court-appointed and does not know the patient well, this
benefit will not be applicable.
81 Consider Dworkin, 13 Health Matrix at 280 (cited in note 10) ("Every significant
decision about a patient's health may have an impact on that person's relatives, depend-
ents, and others."); Robert M. Veatch, Limits of Guardian Treatment Refusal: A Reason-
ableness Standard, 9 Am J L and Med 427, 447-48 (1984) ("A [family member or intimate
friend], understanding the patient better than would a stranger, is better equipped to
interpret the patient's desires.").
82 See, for example, Joe A. Flores, International Scientiic Misconduct and the Legal
System, 9 Currents Int'l Trade L J 60, 65 (2000) (describing the international black mar-
ket in organs that has arisen).
83 Id.
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2. Costs.
a) Personal biases of decisionmaker may be a factor. The
main problem with the substituted judgment standard is that it
is, ultimately, just that-someone else's judgment. There is an
inherent danger that the decisionmaker will look at the evidence
but, in the end, think about what he or she would choose, or al-
low personal biases to become a factor in some other way. 4 If
this occurs, the standard is not as respectful of the patient's
autonomy as it initially appears. This is probably true whether a
judge, a doctor, or even the parents make the decision. Each
might have different kinds of biases, but all most likely have
some biases.
The doctor might think too much in terms of his opinion of
the best medical outcome, without taking into consideration
other opinions or the patient's idiosyncratic preferences. In the
organ donation context for example, a doctor might place too
much value on the fact that it could save the recipient's life and
that it comes at minimal pain and risk to the donor. This would
lead the doctor to more readily determine that the patient would
have wanted to donate.
The judge might come to the same conclusion as the doctor
by focusing too much on a sense of justice. He might think that
donating would be altruistic and the "right" thing for the donor
to do. Especially when the recipient is a family member, most
people would probably characterize refusing to donate as a self-
ish act. However, people sometimes have preferences that are
not entirely "rational"; some people might simply have an aver-
sion to surgery or feel that they do not want to give up one of
their kidneys.8 5 Furthermore, refusing to donate an organ may
actually be very rational, if the donor is only interested in his or
her own health.
Finally, the parents may value the competent child more
than the incompetent child, and may use the substituted judg-
ment standard to save the competent child at the expense of the
incompetent one. This valuing may even take place subcon-
sciously, allowing the parents to feel that they have respected
84 See Peter Skinner, Note, YYpping the Scales: How Guardianship of Brandon has
Upset Massachusetts' Balanced Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 40 BC L Rev 969, 987
(1999) ("There is no way of guaranteeing that the biases of the presiding judge will not
find their way into substituted judgment decisions.").
85 See Robertson, 76 Colum L Rev at 61 (cited in note 2) ("[T]he incompetent, if com-
petent, might not prefer to act as a reasonable person in his circumstances would.").
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the incompetent child's wishes and autonomy while in reality
allowing their bias toward the competent child to be the deciding
factor.
Although being candid about this risk might help to alleviate
it somewhat, even the best-intentioned doctor, judge, or parents
will have some personal opinions that will at least subcon-
sciously enter into the decision. Limiting the use of the substi-
tuted judgment standard to cases where there is a clearly ex-
pressed preference, or at least where the patient was previously
competent, will help reduce this risk.
b) Factors considered may be irrelevant. Although relying on
expressed preferences may be useful, the other factors that are
often considered under the substituted judgment standard may
have no bearing on whether a patient would have actually
wanted to donate. 6 Factors such as previous medical decisions, 7
the patient's "value system,"8 the patient's "religious beliefs," 9
"the impact of the decision on the [patient's] family[,] ... the
probability of adverse side effects[,] ... the prognosis without
treatment[,]... [and] the prognosis with treatment," ° are simply
ways for the decisionmaker to attempt to understand the patient.
But people are complicated; medical decisions, religious beliefs,
and value systems may be contradictory or may not reflect pref-
erences for any one particular medical decision. Furthermore,
while the final four considerations are things that most patients
likely consider when making medical decisions, this may not tell
us anything about the weight, if any, that this particular patient
would have given to them. Therefore, in the absence of expressed
preferences, the likelihood that the decision will accurately re-
flect what the patient would have done will be much lower. This
decrease in accuracy makes the autonomy argument much
weaker.
86 See Cantor, 48 Rutgers L Rev at 1242 (cited in note 7) ("Substituted judgment fails
(in the absence of articulated patient choice) because of its recourse to indeterminate
indices, such as patient lifestyle and character, that do not usually answer the critical
question of when the patient would prefer [a medical procedure].").
87 See In re A. C, 573 A2d at 1250 ("The court should also consider previous decisions
of the patient concerning medical treatment."). See also In re Boyd, 403 A2d at 751 (hold-
ing that when previous actions indicate the patient has a strong adherence to, and has
not vacillated from, a particular viewpoint about treatment, that view should be re-
spected).
88 In reA.C., 573 A2d at 1250.
89 In re Moe, 432 NE2d at 723.
90 Rogers, 458 NE2d at 319.
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c) Inappropriate when the patient was never previously
competent. The situation is further complicated where the pa-
tient has never been competent. 9' This would be the case where
the patient was born severely mentally impaired or became se-
verely mentally impaired while still a child. When a patient has
never previously been competent, substituted judgment truly is a
legal fiction.92 The most important consideration for substituted
judgment is anything that the patient may have said while com-
petent that relates to the decision at hand.93 This kind of evi-
dence will be unavailable in the case of a patient who has never
been competent. Other important evidence includes any previous
medical decisions that the patient has made, and the patient's
value system and/or religious beliefs.94 Again, this evidence will
not be available where the patient has never been competent.
Basing a substituted judgment on the remaining considera-
tions-including "the impact of the decision on the [patient's]
family[,] ... the probability of adverse side effects[,] ... the prog-
nosis without treatment[,] ... the prognosis with treatment[,]...
[and] any other factors which appear relevant"95-without any
information about the patient's prior preferences, is just the best
interests standard in disguise. Pretending to recognize a pa-
tient's autonomy96 while actually using a best interests standard
has the additional risk of leading to outcomes not in the patient's
best interests. 9 The substituted judgment standard, therefore,
should not be used where the patient has never been competent.
91 See Cantor, 48 Rutgers L Rev at 1214-21 (cited in note 7) ("Use of substituted
judgment terminology in the context of never-competent patients is, indeed, confusing."
Id at 1215.).
92 See Morley, 111 Yale L J at 1234 (cited in note 13) ("With regard to nonmature
minors and individuals who have been legally incompetent their entire lives, it is impos-
sible to ascertain their 'likely treatment/nontreatment preferences."') (citations omitted).
See also In re Conroy, 486 A2d at 1231 ("[I]n the absence of adequate proof of the pa-
tient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that the right to self-determination serves as the
basis for substituted decision-making.") (citations omitted).
9' InreA.C., 573 A2d at 1250.
94 Id.
95 Rogers, 458 NE2d at 319.
96 If autonomy is the right to self-determination, it could be argued that a patient
who has never been competent does not have an interest in autonomy. However, that is a
philosophical debate that is beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead, this Comment
proceeds on the assumption that even patients who have been incompetent for their en-
tire lives have an interest in autonomy.
97 See Cantor, 13 Ann Health L at 43 (cited in note 28) ("Others ... criticize surro-
gate decision-making on behalf of profoundly disabled persons because of the potential for
abuse.").
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The arguments in this section also apply to a patient who
was previously competent but had no close friends or relatives
who can testify to his previously expressed preferences, values,
or religious beliefs.
D. Best Interests Standard
Courts have also used a best interests of the patient stan-
dard to make medical decisions for incompetent patients. This
standard takes two different forms: the "limited-objective" test
and the "pure-objective" test.98
Some courts use the limited-objective test when there is
"some trustworthy evidence" as to the patient's prior wishes, but
not enough evidence to satisfy the substituted judgment stan-
dard.99 One court explained that this would be the case when the
patient "has not unequivocally expressed his desires before be-
coming incompetent."1 0 For example, "informally expressed reac-
tions to other people's medical conditions and treatment" would
be enough.'0 ' In other words, the preferences need not have been
expressed so clearly as to permit no question, but they should at
least have some relation to the proposed treatment. After consid-
ering evidence of the patient's wishes, the court weighs the bur-
dens and the benefits to the patient of performing the proce-
dure. 10 2 In In re Conroy,°3 the court was careful to stress that the
burdens and benefits that it would look to would be based on
"medical evidence," and that "the degree, expected duration, and
constancy of pain with and without treatment" were important
considerations.0 4 This test combines the subjective viewpoint of
the substituted judgment standard with the objective viewpoint
of considering what choice is in the patient's best interests.
The pure-objective test looks solely to the net of the burdens
and benefits to the patient of having or not having the treat-
ment. Evidence of the patient's desires regarding medical treat-
ment "is not necessary under this pure-objective test." 5 When
98 For a general discussion, see In re Conroy, 486 A2d at 1209 (discussing the two
best interests tests, the limited and the pure objective tests).
9' Id at 1232.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See In re Conroy, 486 A2d at 1232 (stating that it must be clear that the benefits of
the decision outweigh the burdens).
103 486 A2d 1209 (NJ 1985).
104 Id.
105 Id.
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explaining what the best interests of the patient are, one court
noted that, "it is appropriate to presume that an incompetent
individual would choose in a manner similar to others in the
same circumstances."" 6 It appears that this version of the best
interests standard is what most courts have in mind when they
reference a best interests standard.0 7 In Little v Little, for ex-
ample, the court expressly stated that it would base its opinion
on "the benefits that the incompetent donor would derive.'
08
For both the limited-objective and the pure-objective tests,
courts look to precedent to determine what factors to consider,
unless the state had enacted a statute listing which factors the
court must consider. In the context of organ donation, risks to
the donor include risks associated with all major surgeries1 °9 and
the only real benefit to the donor would be a psychological one."'
This would be the case if, as in Strunk v Strunk, the patient is
close to the recipient and would benefit psychologically from a
continued relationship with him."1 In that case, the court em-
phasized that the practice of organ donation was "becoming in-
creasingly common" and that there was "minimal danger to both
the donor and donee.""' 2 It followed that, for Jerry Strunk, the
small risks of donation were outweighed by the psychological
106 United States v Charters, 829 F2d 479, 498 (4th Cir 1987).
107 See, for example, id (explaining that "[i]f it is not possible to ascertain what [the
patient] would have done were he competent," then the court should use the best inter-
ests standard).
108 576 SW2d at 498. The court in Little approved of the donation because there was
evidence of "a close relationship" and evidence that "[the incompetent donor sister] un-
derstands the concept of absence and that she is unhappy on the occasions when [the
recipient sibling] must leave." Id. Furthermore, the court believed that the donor would
receive benefits in the form of "heightened self-esteem, enhanced status in the family,
renewed meaning in life, and other positive feelings." Id at 499. Because any pain and
discomfort suffered would be minimal, they believed the costs were outweighed by the
benefits. Id at 500.
109 See Strong and Lynch, Ethical Issues in Living Related Donor Liver Transplanta-
tion at 44 (cited in note 15) ("The risk to the donor is that associated with a major opera-
tion in the form of perioperative complications and long-term sequelae."); Spital, Ethical
Issues in Living Related Donors at 103 (cited in note 15) ("Donor nephrectomy is a major
surgical procedure and postoperative complications are inevitable ... average postopera-
tive complication rate of 32% ... most of these were minor.").
110 See Strong and Lynch, Ethical Issues in Living Related Donor Liver Transplanta-
tion at 44 (cited in note 15) ("The only benefit is a psychological one."). An organ donor
may also receive other benefits such as gifts from family members, but this begins to look
like the donor is being paid for the organ. The benefits that courts look to exclusively are
medical or psychological benefits; as there are no medical benefits to donating an organ;
the only benefit is a psychological benefit.
'11 Strunk, 445 SW2d at 146-47.
112 Id at 148.
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benefit the donor would receive."' Because there is no physical
benefit to the patient, the psychological benefits should be espe-
cially strong to justify the physical risks associated with organ
donation.'14
The main benefit of the best interests standard is that it is
more objective than the substituted judgment standard. How-
ever, it may not adequately respect the patient's autonomy and it
may rely on immeasurable elements. This section will elaborate
on these ideas.
1. Benefits.
a) Personal biases less likely to be a factor. The best inter-
ests standard is either a limited- or pure-objective standard. Be-
cause of this objectivity, it is less open to the possibility of per-
sonal biases entering into the decision. When all decisionmakers
use the same rules and consider the same benefits and burdens,
there is less opportunity for the decisionmaker to depart from
the stated rule. Also, if the decisionmaker does depart from the
rule, the fact that the rule was laid out in advance will allow
those reviewing the decision to see this departure and remedy it.
On the other hand, this objective test is not able to get the
subjectively "right" result every time (where "right" refers to
what the patient would have decided if he had the decisionmak-
ing capacity1 5 ). This reflects the classic "rules versus discretion"
problem. A blanket rule may not be appropriate in every case,
but it ensures that there will be little room for abuse of the sys-
tem. Alternatively, a discretionary system has the possibility of
getting the "right" answer every time but opens the door to in-
tentional, or even unintentional, abuse because decisionmakers
lack significant guidance. As such, under a best interests stan-
dard, courts might not get the right result every time. As noted
above, people might have idiosyncratic preferences that would
lead them to do what is not in their best interest. However,
courts can be confident that if they use the same standard every
time, they will reflect the preferences of the majority of the peo-
ple. Alternatively, with an individualized assessment every
113 Id at 149.
114 See, for example, Spital, Ethical Issues in Living Related Donors at 103 (cited in
note 15) (endorsing living related donation when "large psychological benefits" outweigh
the "small risk to the donor").
115 It is clear that we can never know what the patient would have done, unless of
course they suddenly regain competency and tell us. However, this argument relies on
the assumption that there is such a "right" result and we are attempting to reach it.
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time,116 the decisionmaker's preferences and biases can become
part of the decision even if the decisionmaker does not realize
their influence.117 This creates a very real possibility that we will
get the right answer much less often. With an objective test, such
as the best interests standard, this is less likely to happen be-
cause there will be general rules that are followed in every case.
b) More realistic for the never-competent patient. In contrast
to the substituted judgment standard, the best interests stan-
dard is the most realistic way to address the situation where the
patient has never been competent."' As noted above, without
any information about what the patient's prior preferences were,
the substituted judgment standard essentially becomes a best
interests standard anyway. Officially recognizing that the stan-
dard is attempting to determine what is in the patient's best in-
terests will help ensure that the decision is actually in the pa-
tient's best interests. This standard prevents the decisionmaker
from imposing his own beliefs on the patient. Admittedly, this
may still happen. Again, a doctor who believes that there is little
pain or risk involved in an organ donation may believe that it is
in the patient's best interest to donate. However, while the sub-
stituted judgment standard takes into account the effect on the
family and other outside interests, the best interests standard
looks solely to the interests of the patient. The former might be
used to push aside the interests of the patient while mainly look-
ing out for those whose lives seem to be more "valuable." This
may lead the decisionmaker to order the organ removed to save
the life of a competent individual even at risk to the incompetent
patient. The best interests standard, on the other hand, consid-
ers the incompetent patient's life to be an end in itself requiring
that the decisionmaker protect the patient's best interests.11 9
116 Although the best interests standard could be called individualized in that it con-
siders the costs and benefits to the individual patient, the substituted judgment standard
is more individualized because it considers what this patient actually would have wanted.
117 See Skinner, 40 BC L Rev at 987 (cited in note 84) ("There is no way of guarantee-
ing that the biases of the presiding judge will not find their way into substituted judg-
ment decisions.").
118 See, for example, Curran, 566 NE2d at 1325-26. The court notes that, "it is not
possible to determine the intent of a 3 1/2-year-old child with regard to consenting to a
bone marrow harvesting procedure by examining the child's personal value system." Id at
1326.
119 Additionally, part of the solution to the problem might be in choosing the best
decisionmaker. See Part IV.
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2. Costs.
a) May not respect the patient's autonomy. The best inter-
ests standard does not take into account the patient's actual
preferences, which may result in not enough respect being given
to the patient's autonomy. In an individualized society such as
America, we place great weight on the right of the individual to
determine his own destiny. Where the patient has previously
been competent, even if there is no advance health care directive,
many people would be uncomfortable with the idea of not even
trying to determine what the patient's actual preferences would
be. People may feel that if they were incompetent, they would
not want someone to make a decision for them that did not con-
form to their preferences. Even though the patient may have no
awareness of the decision, he is still a human with equal rights
and, therefore, society must attempt to determine what he would
choose to do if he were competent to make the decision.
The limited-objective test, as described above, might address
this problem. That test considers any reliable information about
the patient's subjective preferences. 2 ° This respects the auton-
omy of the patient to the extent that there is available informa-
tion about what decision the patient would make. It also protects
the autonomy of the patient because in the absence of enough
information to make a determination, it looks to the best inter-
ests of the patient. This prevents the biases of the decisionmaker
from entering into the decision. It also prevents the decision-
maker from making a decision based on the effects of the deci-
sion on others, rather than on the patient. However, administra-
tion of this standard would require a threshold determination of
whether there is reliable information. Decisionmakers may have
differing standards about what constitutes reliable information,
and may give different weight to any information that is avail-
able. This would weaken the standard and again open it up to
abuse by the decisionmaker.
b) Relies on immeasurable elements. The best interests
standard weighs the burdens and benefits of the decision. Exam-
ples of factors that the standard looks to are: "the degree, ex-
pected duration, and constancy of pain with and without treat-
ment." 2 ' These considerations and others like them may be im-
120 In re Conroy, 486 A2d at 1232.
121 Id.
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possible to quantify.122 For example, in the medical community,
pain is always considered a subjective experience. 2 3 Each per-
son's conception of pain is different, which makes it very difficult
to compare pain quantitatively. Furthermore, in the context of
organ donation, the only benefit to the donor will be a psycho-
logical one, which is also very difficult to quantify. Because the
objectivity of the standard depends on the weighing of these fac-
tors, if the factors cannot be assigned an objective weight, then
the decisionmaker is placing values on the factors according to
his or her own value system, and the standard is no longer really
objective. In that case, it may be better to use a subjective stan-
dard because it will at least take into consideration the patient's
autonomy.
Where the patient has never been competent, however, these
concerns do not outweigh the concern that the substituted judg-
ment standard is a legal fiction. In that case, even if measuring
these standards is difficult, the best interests standard will at
least attempt to do what is best for the patient.'24
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Some commentators, dissatisfied with the current state of
the doctrine, have proposed alternative approaches to dealing
with this issue. These include: the utilitarian approach, the con-
structive preferences standard, prohibiting incompetent patients
from donating organs, and a reasonableness standard for bonded
guardians. An examination of each of these alternatives demon-
strates that none meets the unique requirements of the never-
competent-incompetent-donor problem while at the same time
respecting the previously competent donor's autonomy.
A. Utilitarian Approach
One proposed alternative is a purely utilitarian approach. 2 '
This involves weighing the benefits and burdens of the decision,
122 Cantor, 48 Rutgers L Rev at 1242 (cited in note 7).
12' See C. David Tollison, John R. Satterthwaite, and Joseph W. Tollison, eds, 2
Handbook of Pain Management 3 (Williams and Wilkins 1994) ("Pain is always subjec-
tive.").
124 See Part II.A.2.c discussing the costs of using substituted judgment when the
patient has never been competent and Part II.B.1.b discussing the benefits of using best
interests when the patient has never been competent.
125 For a general discussion, see Robertson, 76 Colum L Rev at 50-52 (cited in note 2)
(describing the utilitarian approach to organ donation and noting the costs and benefits
of that approach).
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not only to the individual and the family, but also to the recipi-
ent of the organ and to society as a whole. Concerns such as in-
creased health care costs for society (if the patient is a ward of
the state or is otherwise supported by the state) and the benefit
of reducing organ transfer waiting lists are considered. Addition-
ally, the benefits and burdens to the recipient are considered.
Therefore, if the donation posed little risk to the donor and would
be the only way to save the recipient's life, the utilitarian ap-
proach would almost certainly call for the donation to take place.
Although these concerns might already be in the back of people's
minds when making decisions under either of the other two
standards, this approach would bring the concerns into the open.
This would be good because transparency ensures that the deci-
sion is made according to the standard that has been chosen.
With the substituted judgment and best interests standards,
these considerations are not technically part of the equation, but
most likely still play at least a minor role.
Concerns about patient autonomy that are present under
the best interests standard, though, are much greater under a
utilitarian approach.126 Depending on the benefits and burdens
that come into play, the utilitarian approach could lead to a de-
termination directly against the interests of the patient. If the
donation poses a substantial risk to the donor but would save the
life of the recipient, allow someone else to get an organ from the
waiting list, and save costs to society because the recipient would
no longer be using up health care dollars, then the utilitarian
approach would approve of the donation. Depending on the ex-
tent of the risk to the donor and the preferences that the donor
may have expressed in the past, this result could be the exact
opposite of the result that both other standards would reach.
This would, however, be highly contingent upon how much
weight each factor is given. If courts give the patient's right to
self-determination greater weight than factors that do not di-
rectly concern the patient, the risk might be reduced.
This highlights another problem with the utilitarian ap-
proach: the calculations required under this approach call for
placing a quantitative value on interests that may be nearly im-
possible to quantify. How much value to give a patient's auton-
omy interests versus how much value to give meeting the de-
mand for organ donations is not a simple decision. This is similar
to the problem discussed in the context of the best interests
126 Id at 51 ('[U]tilitarianism conflicts with the strictest respect for persons.").
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standard, although it is magnified due to the additional (social
and other) factors considered. In light of this problem, the utili-
tarian approach may become simply a way for the decisionmaker
to make the decision according to his value system, rather than a
determination based on the factors set out to be weighed.
B. Constructive Preferences Standard
Norman L. Cantor has suggested that courts should use a
"constructive preferences" standard.127 This standard, which the
author deals with in terms of dying patients, focuses on the dig-
nity of the individual in arguing that dignity is the driving force
behind most end-of-life decisions. The constructive preferences
approach seems to apply a "reasonable person" standard to these
kinds of medical decisions, focusing on what most people would
want under these circumstances.'28 It is only applicable when the
patient previously was competent and had not executed any ad-
vance health care directives.129 Although the approach is directed
at dying patients or those in a persistent vegetative state, it
could most likely be applied effectively in the organ donation
context. 130
This at first glance might seem like the best interests stan-
dard-it is an objective approach that does not focus on the sub-
jective preferences of the particular patient. However, because it
focuses on what most people would actually do, it might be better
than the best interests standard. This standard could reflect
people's generalized preferences that go against their best inter-
ests. For example, in the end-of-life context, it is against a pa-
tient's medical "best interest" to want to end his or her life. But if
this were what most people would want under the circum-
stances, the constructive preferences approach would reflect that
choice.
The problems with this approach are two-fold. First, who de-
cides what most people would actually want in the circum-
127 See Cantor, 48 Rutgers L Rev 1193 (cited in note 7) (describing the constructive
preferences standard).
128 Id at 1246 ("By utilizing common preferences about intolerable dignity, the incom-
petent is treated with the respect and dignity that most people would expect for them-
selves.") (citation omitted).
129 Id at 1242.
130 Cantor is mainly concerned with remedying the faults of both the substituted
judgment and the best interests standards. Because both standards are also used in the
organ donation context, the constructive preferences standard could potentially remedy
their faults there as well.
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stances?131 A judge? A doctor? A legislator? An academic? 13 2 Sec-
ond, if there is to be an objective standard, will it be based on
surveys, anecdotal evidence, or something else? If the construc-
tive preference is to be decided by the decisionmaker in the indi-
vidual case, it really becomes just another vehicle for that deci-
sionmaker to project his own beliefs about what he would want
done onto everyone else and, more importantly, onto the patient.
Because the author suggests that this should only apply where
the patient has left no advance health care directive, the prob-
lems with patient autonomy may not be present. However, where
the patient has expressed his preferences in a more informal
way, such as by expressing his wishes to a close loved one, not
honoring those preferences may be denying the patient's auton-
omy.
C. Prohibiting Organ Donation by Incompetent Patients
Another approach would prohibit organ donation by incom-
petent patients in all cases. 133 One commentator argues that a
best interests standard is inappropriate because "courts refuse
such a balance of benefits and harms when asked to compel com-
petent adults to donate organs. 1 34 Because a court would never
compel a competent adult to donate, incompetent patients should
also be protected from being compelled to donate. Categorically
prohibiting organ donation by incompetent patients would osten-
sibly prevent abuse of incompetent patients and would get
around the failures of both the substituted judgment and best
interests standards.
In that it side steps the issue entirely, this approach does
not share the flaws of the substituted judgment or best interests
standards. However, as discussed above, prohibiting organ dona-
tion by incompetent patients may not in fact respect a patient's
131 Although any approach will have a similar problem, the problem is unique under
this standard. Here, the decisionmaker is attempting to determine what most people
would want, rather than just what this particular person would want. Under the substi-
tuted judgment standard, the decisionmaker is deciding what this patient actually would
want. Under the best interests standard the decisionmaker is deciding what is in this
patient's actual best interests. Both of those inquiries are very different than deciding
what mostpeople would actually want.
132 An interesting point is that all of these potential decisionmakers are members of
society's elite and they might project their view of the value of life onto people who may
have radically different priorities than they do.
133 For a general discussion, see Cheyette, 41 BC L Rev 465 (cited in note 16) (arguing
that incompetent patients should never be allowed to donate organs).
134 Id at 469.
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autonomy where that patient had desired to donate organs.135
Given the autonomy concerns, the low risk to the donor, and the
enormous potential benefits, this argument is an attempt to
reach a simple solution to a complicated problem and, as a re-
sult, the argument fails to reach the nuances of this problem.136
The autonomy argument alone is important enough (both legally
and ethically) to demand that we find a standard whereby pa-
tients who had, or would have, desired to donate organs could do
SO.
Where the patient has never been competent, there might be
an argument for prohibiting organ donation entirely. However,
some patients who are not competent to make medical decisions
are still competent enough to have valuable relationships with
family members. Therefore, it seems that there is a very real
possibility of a donor reaping psychological benefits from dona-
tion.
D. Reasonableness Standard for Bonded Guardians
Another alternative approach that has been proposed would
grant bonded guardians broad discretion over the medical deci-
sions of their incompetent wards.137 Bonded guardians are those
guardians "who had a bond with the patient that preexisted the
guardian-patient relationship, ""' such as a family member or
close friend. Under the reasonableness standard, the bonded
guardian would have the discretion to make "those decisions that
would be both legal and ethical."139 The reasonableness standard
for bonded guardians is proposed in the context of refusing treat-
ment, although it could almost certainly be adapted to the organ
donation context.
In the case of a minor child, this standard seems to make
sense. Even with an adult child, many people would consider the
parent the best decisionmaker. However, when two children are
involved the parent may be overly concerned about the welfare of
135 See Part II.A.l.a (discussing the reasons that prohibiting organ donation by in-
competent patients under all circumstances would not respect their autonomy).
136 We sometimes use simple solutions for complicated problems. For example, we
prohibit selling organs despite some of the same concerns. An important distinction,
though, is that with organ donation competent people are allowed to donate, whereas this
solution would prohibit all incompetent people from donating, regardless of the degree of
incompetence or the patient's previously expressed wishes.
137 For a general discussion, see Veatch, 9 Am J L and Med 427 (cited in note 81)
(arguing that bonded guardians should be given broad discretion).
13s Id at 428.
'3' Id at 434.
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the competent sibling who would receive the organ and not as
concerned with the incompetent sibling's welfare. Furthermore,
if the parent or guardian had ultimate control over the decision,
this decision would be almost impossible to review. In the case of
an adult child, concern over that adult's autonomy should out-
weigh the parent's, or bonded guardian's, interests in the deci-
sionmaking.
Another problem with this standard is the use of the inher-
ently value laden terms "legal" and "ethical." Who decides which
decisions are legal and which are ethical? If a court is reviewing
the guardian's decisions to make sure that they are legal and
ethical, isn't the court essentially making the decision? And if
the court does not review the decision, how can we be sure that it
truly is legal and ethical? These problems illustrate that holding
bonded guardians to a reasonableness standard is not satisfac-
tory.
IV. THE DECISIONMAKER
There is an animated debate over whether a court, a doctor,
a guardian acting alone, or some other decisionmaker should
make the determination of whether the incompetent patient will
be an organ donor. Washington v Harper,4 ° a Supreme Court
case addressing prisoners' medical rights, held that a medical
professional could exercise substituted judgment for an incompe-
tent prisoner, and that due process concerns did not require a
court to make the determination.' Quoting a previous case, the
Court explained, "we do not accept the notion that the shortcom-
ings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision
from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical
science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer
after a judicial-type hearing."142 The Court stopped short, though,
of saying that a judge could never make the decision. 4' In light
of this, some state courts have required a judicial determina-
tion."'44 The current state of the law is therefore mixed between
140 494 US 210 (1990).
141 Id.
142 Id at 232 (quoting Parham v JR., 442 US 584, 609 (1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
143 The question at issue in the case was "whether a judicial hearing is required." Id at
213. Therefore, the Court only addressed whether a judicial hearing was required, not
whether it was allowed.
144 See, for example, Rogers, 458 NE2d 308, 310 (Mass 1983) ("If a patient is adjudi-
cated incompetent, a judge, using a substituted-judgment standard, shall decide whether
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judges and medical professionals making these important deter-
minations for the incompetent patient. Each approach has bene-
fits, but there are also costs involved.
Doctors might argue that they should make these decisions
because they have a better understanding of the medical issues
at stake and the effects of the procedure on the patient. Fur-
thermore, a doctor may have worked with the patient for a long
time and thus know his condition and, possibly, his family. Also,
doctors may believe that it is a waste of time and resources to go
to a judge, especially because the patient may die while waiting
for a judge's decision which makes the organ potentially unus-
able. On the other hand, doctors may allow the potential benefits
to the recipient and the low risk to the donor to cloud their vi-
sion. They may neglect to consider any previously expressed
preferences and values, or what is truly in the donor's best inter-
ests.
Judges might argue that medical expertise is not necessary
to make the correct decision. The patient, if competent, would
likely have about the same level of medical knowledge as the
court. Therefore, a judge might be in a better position than a doc-
tor to decide what the patient really would have wanted. Fur-
thermore, because the judge is presumably impartial, he might
not be as influenced by the potential benefit to the recipient of
the organ transfer. Another benefit is that the judge's decision is
reviewable. If the surrogate is not happy with the doctor's deci-
sion, it might be harder to get the decision overturned. A judge's
ruling, though, can be appealed. On the other hand, the judge
may have strong convictions about what "justice" requires and
put those convictions above the patient's autonomy. A concern
that should be considered with both a doctor and a judge is that
any individual acting alone may be unethical.
One commentator has argued that the parent or guardian
should have broad control, at least where the guardian is
"bonded" to the patient.145 As the discussion above highlights,
however, this standard has drawbacks that make it an unattrac-
tive option.146
the patient would have consented [to the treatment]."); Saikewicz, 370 NE2d at 433 ("The
Probate Court is ... the proper tribunal to determine the best interests of a ward.").
145 Veatch, 9 Am J L and Med at 428 (cited in note 81) (arguing for broad discretion
for "a guardian who had a bond with the patient that preexisted the guardian-patient
relationship").
146 See Part III.D.
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Some hospitals use a hospital ethics committee or review
board to determine whether an incompetent patient should be
allowed to donate an organ.'47 Multiple doctors, ethicists, reli-
gious experts, social workers, lawyers, and even judges may sit
on the board.148 The participation of multiple people ensures that
one person's viewpoint does not dominate the decision, and, fur-
thermore, that the decision is more likely to be free of corruption
or unethical motives. Having doctors on the board provides the
medical expertise, and the ethicist or judge might bring to the
table ideas about justice. Often the doctor who is working di-
rectly with the patient will not sit on the board, so that it will be
more objective-although the doctor could sit on the board to
provide a more personal understanding of the situation. This
alternative seems to combine the benefits of both the judge and
the doctor, while canceling out some of the costs of having one or
the other as the sole decisionmaker.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Resolving the issues of what standard should be used and
who should make the decision is complicated and involves many
considerations. The discussion above has highlighted the most
important considerations in determining if an incompetent per-
son should be able to donate their organs and leads to the rec-
ommendation that follows.
The substituted judgment standard should be used when
there is reliable evidence as to the patient's preferences for
treatment under the circumstances. Reliable evidence would in-
clude both written statements and statements made to family
members or close friends during serious discussions about the
issue. Comments made during casual conversation or not directly
related to the topic should not be considered. Other factors often
considered, such as previous medical decisions, religious beliefs,
and the effect on family and friends, should not be used. When
the patient has never been competent, or when there is inade-
quate information about the patient's prior preferences, the best
interests standard should be used. Donating an organ will only
be in the patient's best interest if it will have a psychological
benefit. This will require proof that the incompetent patient has
147 For a general discussion, see Brendan Minogue, Bioethics: A Committee Approach
(Jones and Bartlett 1996) (describing the make-up and function of a hospital ethics com-
mittee).
148 Id at 3.
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a relationship with the recipient and benefits from this relation-
ship. In sum, when there is no evidence of a patient's prefer-
ences, the decisionmaker should weigh the potential psychologi-
cal benefits against the risks of donation and determine what is
in the patient's best interests.
Using the substituted judgment standard when there are
clearly expressed preferences will respect the patient's autonomy
and his right to choose organ donation. The substituted judg-
ment standard also reflects a belief that individualized decisions,
based on adequate evidence, will lead to the best results. On the
other hand, when the patient has never been competent, the best
interests of the patient standard will ensure that incompetent
patients' rights and autonomy are protected. Incompetent indi-
viduals will not be used for harvesting organs when it is against
their best interests. Where there is no reliable evidence of an
incompetent individual's wishes, autonomy is better served by
ensuring the most objective decisionmaker possible.
Alternatives have been presented to deal with these prob-
lems. However, none of the alternatives proposed have ade-
quately alleviated these problems without raising other, poten-
tially more serious, problems.
Deciding who the decisionmaker should be is just as impor-
tant as what standard that decisionmaker should use. A judge, a
doctor, the guardian acting alone, or a hospital review board
could make the decision about whether to allow donation. The
discussion above highlights the costs and benefits of each ap-
proach.'49 The best option for the decisionmaker is a hospital eth-
ics committee or review board. A committee will prevent one per-
son's viewpoint or biases from dominating the decision. Fur-
thermore, this approach will ensure that the most objectively
correct interpretation of either standard is applied to the particu-
lar case.
CONCLUSION
Incompetent patients cannot make medical decisions for
themselves; instead, they rely on their guardians, the legal sys-
tem, and society to find ways for those medical decisions to be
made appropriately. In the context of organ donation, surrogates
face a decision that would not necessarily pose a serious risk to
the patient, but also may not present an immediate medical
149 See Part IV.
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benefit to the patient. On the other hand, the decision would
have the potential to greatly benefit the recipient of the organ. It
is against this background that courts and legal commentators
have struggled to find a standard that would both respect the
autonomy of the incompetent patient and protect that patient's
best interests.
The recommendation proposed by this Comment seeks to re-
spect patient autonomy when there is enough evidence to do so.
However, it recognizes that, without adequate evidence, the sub-
stituted judgment standard will become a forum for the deci-
sionmaker to decide whether he, rather than the patient, would
be an organ donor in a similar situation. The recommendation
that the best interests standard be used in those cases is an ac-
knowledgment of this concern and an attempt to protect the in-
competent patient from abuse. Furthermore, the use of a hospital
ethics committee or review board is also a useful attempt to en-
sure that the patient receives the most unbiased decision that
truly reflects either his own preferences or his best interests.
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